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Quattlebaum: Constitutional Law--Freedom of Religion--Limitation on Civil Cour

COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF
RELIGION-LIMITATION ON CIVIL COURTS
IN INTRA-CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES*
I. INTROOUOTION

Churches, as regularly as any other juristic person, buy, sell,
lease and mortgage their property. So long as any litigation
which may result from these transactions involves the church
and a secular party, civil courts have not hesitated to adjudicate the rights of the respective parties. However, when disputes
over church property have arisen within a church, most courts
have not been so willing to act.' In intra-church property dispute cases the courts are faced with a dilemma. On the one
hand, there is the necessity of settling questions of property
ownership. On the other hand, there is the desire not to take
sides in religious disputes.
Of the hundreds of reported contests between rival religious groups over church properties, nearly all are, at
heart, either controversies over the identity of the
authoritative decision-making body or over the purposes for which the decision-making body can validly
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 89 S. Ct. 601 (1969).
1. A typical expression of this reticence-in the language of that day-is
found in an early South Carolina case.
I would not allow myself to believe, that parties professing that
religion which, above all others, inculcates peace, humility and forgiveness of injuries, would reject the suggestions of christian
friends, proposing terms of reconciliation, or fail to seize with
avidity the opportunities so frequently afforded, since the hearing,
to accommodate a dispute so dishonoring to the Saviour whom they
follow, so disreputable to themselves, and so destructive to the
church. Being, now, painfully convinced that there is an unhallowed
bitterness in this lamentable controversy

. . .

which forbids the

hope of reconciliation among the litigants, I am reduced to the
deplorable necessity of delivering the judgment of a civil tribunal
in a case of a spiritual nature.
Harmon v. Dreher, Speers' Eq. 87, 90-91 (S.C. 1843). It has also been suggested that the courts have been too willing to involve themselves in internal
church disputes- expressions to the contrary notwithstanding. Chafee, The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. Rxv. 993, 102324 (1930).
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use the properties consistently with principles of the
institution. These are really religious questions. They
become legal questions only when the law determines
that it will support one side or the other. Perhaps the
courts must decide these cases one way or the other in
order to preserve the rule of law. But it would seem
that in doing so they have unwittingly approached the
2
limits of constitutionality.
The question of the constitutional limits on a civil court's
power to decide contests over church property between religious groups is a question of national interest and importance. Denominational mergers and increased involvement of
churches in current social, economic, and political issues are
spawning grounds for intra-church controversies. When these
disputes prove to be irreconcilable the question of who is entitled to the church property usually arises.
Church property was the subject matter of the dispute in
Presbyteia Church in the United States v. Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church.3 Two local Presbyterian churches in
Savannah, Georgia, voted to withdraw from the general church
4
body and to establish themselves as independent organizations.
The ministers and a large majority of the Session renounced
the authority of the general church. The Presbytery of which
the churches were members appointed a commission to seek a
reconciliation. This effort being unsuccessful, the commission
acknowledged the withdrawal of the ministers and the members
of the congregation and "proceeded to take over the local
churches' property on behalf of the general church until new
local leadership could be appointed." 5 Instead of appealing to
the Synod of Georgia or the General Assembly, the dissident
2. Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62
MicH. L. REV. 419, 434 (1964).
3. 89 S. Ct. 601 (1969).
4. The Presbyterian Church is an association of local Presbyterian
churches. The government of the church is through a system of ascending
judicatories. These are the Session, which is composed of Elders elected by the
local congregation, the Presbytery, which is composed of a number of local
churches, the Synod, which is composed of the Presbyteries within a state as a
general rule, and the General Assembly, which is the highest judiciary. See
89 S. Ct. 601 (1969) ; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872) ; Bouchelle v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 A.
100 (1937) ; Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956).

5. 89 S. Ct. at 603.
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members sought an injunction in the civil courts asking that the
general church be enjoined from trespassing.
The dissident members argued that the general church had
departed from doctrines observed by the Presbyterian Church
when the two local churches had associated with that organization; that the general church had violated its own constitution;
and, therefore, neither the local churches nor the civil court was
bound by a decision of the general church as to the property.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision
in favor of the local churches 6 on the theory that Georgia law
implies a trust of local church property for the benefit of the
general church on the sole condition that the general church
adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time
of affiliation by the local churches.7 The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that civil courts could not
resolve church property disputes by interpreting ecclesiastical
decisions.
II. TnE

DocTRriN

OF WATSON V. JONES

The leading case in this area of constitutional law8 has been
Watson v. Jones.9 It, too, involved a dispute over church doctrine between factions within a local Presbyterian church. The
dissident faction sought to withdraw from the general church
organization and take the property with it. Another faction of
the congregation remained loyal to the general church and was
recognized by the general church. The Court said that the
trustees of the local church, who held nominal title to the
property, "obviously [held] possession for the use of the persons
who by the constitution, usages and laws of the Presbyterian
body, [were] entitled to that use."' 1° The resolution of the question of which faction was entitled to the property was made to
turn on the decision of the general church as to which faction
constituted the true Presbyterian church.
6. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Eastern Heights Presby-

terian Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
7. 89 S. Ct. at 603.
8. See generally C. ZOLLWAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAWv §§ 330-40 (1933);

Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICe. L.
REv. 419 (1964); Judicial Intervention in, Church Property Disputes-Some
ConstitutionalConsiderations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113 (1965); 54 VA. L. REv. 1451
(1968).
9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
10. Id. at 720.
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[Whenever the question of discipline or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by
the highest of these church judicatories to which the
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept
such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in
their application to the case before them."
The grounds on which the Court based its decision were
three-fold. First, the right of individuals to form religious
societies and organize them as they saw fit was well recognized
throughout the country. The Court reasoned that this privilege
would be a hollow one if the governing authority of the society,
as set up by its members, were to be constantly undermined by
the civil courts. 12 Second, any persons who chose to join such an
organization did so "with an implied consent to this government,
and are bound to submit to it.13 Third, the Court felt that civil

courts would not be as competent to answer religious questions
concerning the doctrines of the numerous sects as would the
appointed bodies within each sect. "It would therefore be an
appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should
decide the case, to the one which is less so." 1 4 For these reasons
the Court held that although the civil courts are obligated to
settle property disputes between religious bodies, they may not
do so on the basis of resolving questions of religious faith and
doctrine.
In addition, the Court in Watson v. Jones sought to set up
guidelines for civil courts in cases concerning all intra-church
property disputes. These cases were separated into three general classifications.
1. The first of these is when property which is the subject of the controversy has been by deed or will of the
donor, or other instrument by which the property is
held, by the express terms of the instrument devoted to
the teaching, support or spread of some specific form of
religious doctrine or belief.
2. The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation which by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical
11. Id. at 727.
12. Id. at 729.
13. Id.
14, Id.
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associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher
authority.
3. The third is where the religious congregation or
ecclesiastical body holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organization
in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with
a general and ultimate power of control more or less
complete in some supreme judicatory over the whole
membership of the general organization. 15
As to the first classification-where the property is subject
to express conditions-the Court expressed no doubt that civil
courts should see that the terms of the instrument are carried
out. To accomplish that end the courts might inquire into
matters of religious faith and doctrine. 18
As to the second classification-where the property is held
by a church which adheres to a congregational or independent
form of government-the right to the use and control of the
property should be determined according to the principles governing voluntary associations. This, in the usual situation, would
be according to a majority rule unless some other method were
agreed upon. Since there is no express trust of the property
in such cases, the courts should not imply one "for the purpose of expelling from its use those who by regular succession
and order constitute the church, because they may have changed
17
in some respect their views of religious truth."'
It was into the third classification-where the property is
held by a church which adheres to a hierarchical form of government-that the case before the Court was placed.", As noted
above, the civil courts in such a case must accept the decision
of the church judiciary which the factions had recognized
before their dispute.
Since the dispute before the Court in Watson was within the
third classification, the Court's guidelines as to the first two
classifications were dictum. Also, the principles were based on
15. Id. at 722-24.
16. Id. at 723-24.
17. Id. at 725.
18. Courts sometimes refer to hierarchical churches as associated or connectional in contrast to the congregational or independent churches. See, e.g.,
Hardin v. Horger, 166 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. 1969).
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federal common law rather than on constitutional requirements.
The case, moreover, was decided before Eie Railroad Co. v.
Tormpkins 9 and before the first amendment was made applicable
to the states via the fourteenth amendment.2 0 In spite of these
limitations on the decision's authority, the guidelines have been
2 1
widely accepted and followed.
Because of these limitations, however, and because questions
regarding the ownership and use of property are primarily
matters of state concern, litigation arising out of intra-church
property disputes has been confined largely to the state courts.
The Court followed the doctrine of Watson v. Jones in Gonzalez v. Roman Catlolic Archbishop of Manilla,2 2 a case in
which a chaplaincy in the Roman Catholic Church was the subject matter under dispute. The chaplaincy was founded in a will
by which the testatrix transferred certain property to the archbishop to maintain the chaplaincy, and made provision for the
appointment of the chaplain. The petitioner, Gonzalez, presented himself to the Archbishop for appointment. Although he
qualified under the provisions of the will as the nearest living
relative of the testatrix, the Archbishop denied him the chaplaincy on the ground that he was unqualified according to the
canon law of the church. 23 Justice Brandeis, speaking for the
Court, made no mention of the Constitution. He cited Watson as
authority for the Court's decision not to direct the Archbishop
to appoint Gonzalez to the chaplaincy.
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Watson originated in a Kentucky District Court.

Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
20. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952). Other

cases have established that the first amendment privileges are protected from
state action. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
21. See Bouchelle v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del.

Ch. 58, 194 A. 100 (1937); First Protestant Reformed Church v. De Wolfe,
v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351,
197 A. 736 (1938) ; Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943) ;
Anderson v. Byers, 269 Wis. 93, 69 N.W2d 227 (1955). Although Watson

344 Mich. 624, 75 N.W.2d 19 (1956); Kelly

has been widely followed, it would be too great an oversimplification to say
that the principles for solving intra-church property disputes are clear and

this area of the law is certain. "Like equity of old is said to have differed
with the length of the feet of the various chancellors who dispersed it, so
justice in this important subject will differ with the sense of right and wrong
of the particular judge or judges before whom any particular controversy is
decided." C. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 320, at 305 (1933).
22. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).

23. Id. at 11-12.
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In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights,
are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them
so by contract or otherwise.24
There being no allegation of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness,
nor any evidence that the controlling canon law was not followed, the Court accepted the Archbishop's decision as to
25
Gonzalez's appointment.
In the 1952 case of Kedroff v. St. Nichiolas Cathedra2 6 the
Supreme Court raised the Watson decision to constitutional
status. The question involved was the right to the use and
control of St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Greek Catholic Church. The property was claimed by both the
American and the Russian branches of the church. The decision
turned on which of the two bishops appointed by the respective
branches was entitled to occupancy of the Cathedral. The New
York Court of Appeals had held that the American bishop was
entitled to occupancy, relying on a New York statute which had
in effect declared the American branch an independent and
autonomous religious organization. 27 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded declaring the statute an unconstitutional
prohibition on "the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the
Church's [the Russian branch's] choice of its hierarchy." 28 The
Court quoted extensively from Watson.
The opinion [Watson v. Jones] radiates . . . a spirit of

freedom for religious organizations, an independence
from secular control or manipulations, in short, power
to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith
and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no
improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must
now be said to have federal constitutional protection
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
344 U.S. 94 (1952).
St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).

28. 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952).
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as a part of the free exercise of religion against state
interference.2 9
III. THE

FUNDAMENTAL DEvIATIoN

EXCEPTION

An important exception to the Watson guidelines has been
recognized by some courts. Particularly where congregational
church property disputes are involved, courts have allowed the
majority to control and use the property only so long as the
majority remained faithful to the tenets of faith and doctrine
observed in the church before the dispute arose. Where, however, the majority has adopted a fundamental deviation from
the church's faith and doctrine, the minority faction has been
held entitled to the use and control of the property. These
decisions have sometimes been based on an implied trust theory 0
and sometimes on the ground that it is a necessary restraint on
the powers of the majority. 31 In these cases the courts have had
to deal with and decide religious issues. They have had to decide
which doctrines were recognized by the factions before their
dispute and whether the doctrinal deviations are fundamental.
As noted above, the fundamental deviation argument has been
applied most often in the case of congregational' churches. It
has sometimes, however, been used in hierarchial church disputes. 32 This was the argument urged on the Court by the two

local churches in the Hull Memorial Presbyterian Churoh case.
The Court, however, quite clearly struck down this exception to
the principle of Watson:
29. Id. at 116. On remand, the New York court again awarded the property
to the American branch, this time on the basis of the state's common law. St.
Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 164 N.E2d 687 (1959). The
controversy reached the Supreme Court again in Kreshik v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960), and again the Court reversed. The action of
the New York judiciary was deemed as unconstitutional as that of the New
York legislature. For a critical analysis of the St. Nicholas Cathedral decisions, see P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 91-96 (1962) and 74 YALE
L.J. 1113, 1123-28 (1965).
30. Ashman v. Studebaker, 115 Ind. App. 73, 56 N.E.2d 674 (1944); Hall
v. Deskins, 252 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952); Annot, 70 A.L.R. 75
(1931) ; Annot., 8 A.L.R. 105 (1920).
31. Huber v. Thorn, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962) ; Reid v. Johnston,
241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954).
32. More often that not the argument, when applied in a hierarchical church
situation, has been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bouchelle v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 A. 100 (1937); First Protestant
Reformed Church v. DeWolfe, 344 Mich. 624, 75 N.W.2d 19 (1956); Kelly
v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 A. 736 (1938). The argument was adopted,
however, in Landrith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1907).
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[T]he departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia
implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the
First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing
such a role.33
IV.

CoNcLwsIoN

Although in the Hull MemoriaZ Presbyterian Church decision
the Supreme Court has again affirmed Watson, as modified by
Gongalez, and given it constitutional standing, there are questions -which remain unanswered and which will need to be determined by future litigation in this area of the law. That
there is still some doubt as to how much of the guidelines set
out in Watson is required by the Constitution, is evident in
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. He agrees with the rejection of the fundamental deviation principle, but he questions
whether the Constitution prohibits the courts from deciding religious questions in order to carry out the terms of a conveyance
where church property is subject to express conditions that the
property be held only so long as certain religious doctrines are
observed. He answers this query in the negative. 34 This
issue, however, was not before the Court, and Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, did not deal with it. It
would seem that a church which accepted property subject to
express conditions would, by its acceptance, imply its consent
to have any questions regarding a breach of those conditions
settled by the civil courts. On the other hand, it is arguable
that where there is no expression to the contrary, the person
creating the conditions involving the religious may have "preferred to abide by a final decision from the theologians of his
church rather than from a court which would very likely include members of entirely different faiths or no faith at all."3 35
In refusing to broaden the doctrine of Watson-except as
modified by Gonzaez-the Supreme Court has set rather narrow
constitutional limits on the civil courts in intra-church property
disputes. The civil courts can review ecclesiastical decisions
33. 89 S. Ct. at 607.

34. Id. at 608.
35. Chaffee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv.
L. REV. 993, 1024 (1930).
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which affect rights to property only to determine whether those
decisions "resulted from fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness." 36
The Court chose not to explain the limits of this right of review which was adopted from the Gonzalez decisions. 7 Unfortunately, Justice Brandeis' opinion in Gonzalez sheds little
additional light.88 These terms-fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness-suggest a review of the manner or procedures by which a
church, whether congregational or hierarchical, decides a religious question rather than a review of the substance of the
decision. However, a church's procedure for deciding religious
questions is a part of its form of government to which a member agrees, either expressly or implicitly, to submit upon association with the church. The form of church government, i.e., the
procedure by which a church reaches ecclesiastical decisions, is
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments from interference by the state. This is the essence of the Watson, Gonzalez,
Kedroff, and Hll Memorial PresbyterianChurch decisions. If,
therefore, a church follows its own appropriate rules in reaching
ecclesiastical decisions which affect church property, it will be
difficult to prove fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.
Finally, there is the question of whether states, religious organizations and individuals can "structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions," 3 9 as the Court's opinion suggests
they should do, so that "neutral principles of law.., can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is
awarded." 40 This also will be difficult to do. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his concurring opinion in Kedroff 'V.St.
Nicholas Cathedral: "St. Nicholas Cathedral is not just a piece
of real estate. . . . A cathedral is the seat and center of ecclesiastical authority. . . What is at stake here is the power to
.

exercise religious authority. That is the essence of this controversy."141 And that is an ecclesiastical question.
MARVIN QUATTLEBAUX

36. 89 S. Ct. at 607.
37. Id. n.7.
38. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
39. 89 S. Ct. at 606.
40. Id.
41. 344 U.S. 94, 121 (1952).
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